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Introduction 
 
A non-recognized state (interchangeable terms: Para-state, quasi-state) 
is a political entity possessing all the attributes of statehood (for 
example political system, armed forces, foreign policy), but it does not 
have international recognition of statehood status.1 Formally, it is a 
part of another state. A non-recognized State is an entity where a 
separatist center of power controls the territory concerned on the path 
of armed conflict, but is not strong enough to force recognition of the 
territory's independence from the home State.2 The collapse of the 
Soviet Union implied the creation of many such entities within the 
post-Soviet area, e.g. the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), 
Abkhazia or the Pridnestrovian Republic of Moldova. Russia is often 
the patron of strengthening the statehood of para-states. The aim of the 
article is to analyze the use of cooperation with countries not 
recognized by the Russian Federation to strengthen its geopolitical 
position in competition with the West on the example of Russian 
influence in Transnistria.  
 
The thesis of the article is as follows: Supporting separatist tendencies 
in Transnistria is one of the elements enabling Russia to maintain its 
position as a hegemon in the post-Soviet area, which affects its position 
in the global competition for power. In order to characterize this issue 
adequately, it is necessary to answer the following research questions: 
How does the Russian Federation Strengthen the Statehood of the 
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic? What are the strategic benefits for 
Russia of cooperation with Transnistria? 
 
The author's motivation for the research is the topicality of the subject 
matter and its priority for the security of not only Moldova, but also of 
the whole Europe. The ongoing war in the east of Ukraine (2014- ) is 
the best example of the fact that the functioning of parastatal states and 
Russian support for them is a challenge for the entire international 
community. Author used a various research tools including analysis of 
documents and statements of leading political decision-makers of the 
Russian Federation and Transnistria. The events of the second decade 
of the 21st century have priority.  
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Historical Background to the Pridnestrovian Moldavian 
Republic Uprisings 
 
Transnistria (the official name of the unrecognized state: 
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) is a region of Moldova located on 
the left bank of the Dniester River and includes the right-bank town of 
Bender with its surrounding villages. According to the latest census 
conducted by the authorities in Tiraspol in 2015 (Tiraspol is the capital 
of the parastatal state), the territory of Transnistria is inhabited by 
476,000 people. What is characteristic, the majority of the population 
is Slavic (29.1 percent - Russians and 22.9 percent Ukrainians).3 
Notably, the Moldovans living in the area (28.6 percent of the 
population) are strongly pro-Russian and have a Russian (Soviet) 
identity.4 Transnistria is the only region in the world where citizens 
write the Moldovan language in the Cyrillic alphabet, but from the 
perspective of the whole society it must be said that Russian is the 
dominant language in administration and daily communication.5 This 
identity identification, completely different from the rest of Moldova, is 
a result of the history of the region. Slavic civilization strongly 
influenced Transnistria in the 5th century as part of the extensive 
colonization of Slavs from the Don River to the Elbe River. As early as 
the 8th and 9th centuries, the Slavs became the dominant force in the 
Transnistrian region. Until the middle of the 10th century, the Slavs 
resisted attempts to include this territory in Kievan Ruthenia, but in 
the end, most of Transnistria managed to submit to the prince 
Svyatoslav Igorevich. However, the rule of Kiev did not last long, 
because already in the 11th century the area was under the rule of 
nomadic tribes, while the Mongols conquered the whole Kievan Rus in 
the 13th century.6 Despite the brief influence of Russia on the 
Transnistrian lands, one of the arguments accentuated by the elite of 
Tiraspol that Transnistria is an extreme area of the Russian World and 
its inhabitants have a Russian identity.7 
 
The international community treats Transnistria as an integral part of 
Moldova. It has in fact functioned as an independent entity towards the 
political center in Chisinau since the early 1990s, including foreign 
policymaking, its central bank (and its own currency, the Transnistrian 
ruble) and political system. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic is a 
result of the Transnistrian-Russian War (1992), which ended in the 
success of separatist troops. Moldova begun the process of military 
suppression of separatist sentiments in the rebellious region, which, 
after the Republic of Moldova regained sovereignty, expressed the 
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desire to separate from the country and build a separate state. Chisinau 
has encountered strong resistance to the mobilized potential of 
Transnistria, supported by voluntary forces from other post-Soviet 
states that have defended Transnistria's membership of the Russian 
World.8 Particularly important points in the planning activities of 
Moldovan strategists were Dubossary cities (due to the proximity of the 
largest hydroelectric power plant) and Bender on the right bank of the 
border, which were a shield for the capital of the paraphernalia, in 
other words Tiraspol. Not without significance was the significant 
support of the Russian Federation in the course of military operations. 
Russian (formerly Soviet) troops of the 14th Army stationed near the 
city of Bender, which were directly involved on the side of Transnistria. 
This was a key event that helped to break the siege of the city, which 
had lasted since April 1992, as part of the Moldovan operation “Trojan 
Horse.” In June 1992, the merged Russian and Transnistrian troops 
finally succeeded in clearing the city of the Moldovan armed 
formations.9  
 
Due to the change in the strategic situation to the detriment of 
Moldova, political decision-makers decided to initiate peace talks. In 
the end, both sides accepted a peace agreement 21 July 1992. The 
document signed by the Presidents of Moldova (Mircea Snegur) and 
the Russian Federation (Boris Yeltsin) indicates the desire to seek a 
peaceful solution to the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region, 
confirming compliance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and the Conference on Security, and Cooperation in Europe. 
The parties to the conflict are obliged to take steps towards a ceasefire 
and any armed action against each other, to remove military 
equipment, weapons and military units within 7 days so that a security 
zone can be established between them. Under Article 2 of the 
Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed 
Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova, a 
Control Commission consisting of representatives of the three parties 
(Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria) had to maintain security in the 
zone. In addition, the Commission was to monitor the implementation 
of the ceasefire measures. The city of Bender became its seat. The 
parties have declared the secondment of military contingents in charge 
of peacekeeping in the zone in accordance with the decisions taken by 
the Commission.10 Since then, a process of unsuccessful peace 
negotiations for a final settlement of the breakaway status of 
Transnistria has begun, which is still ongoing today. From that moment 
on, the process of fruitless peace negotiations, which are still ongoing 
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today, began, leading to the final settlement of the separatist status of 
Transnistria. At the same time, the process of consolidating the 
statehood of Transnistria is progressing, which would not be so 
dynamic if Tiraspol did not have such multifaceted support from the 
Russian Federation.11  
 
Influence of the Russian Federation on Strengthening the 
Statehood of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and 
Independence from Moldova 
 
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Transnistria is 
multifaceted. Strengthening bilateral relations is a strategic objective of 
the authorities in Tiraspol. Both political decision-makers and the 
people of the region see good relations with Russia as a guarantee of 
the existence of the parastatal state in its present form and as a factor 
strengthening the welfare of the society. The intensively developed 
bilateral relations relate primarily to the areas of military, economic, 
and social cooperation, as well as political and diplomatic cooperation. 
 
In the case of the military dimension of cooperation between Tiraspol 
and Moscow, it is worth stressing the presence of Russian armed forces 
in Transnistria. The mission, which aims to maintain peace in the 
territory of the rebellious region, consists of 402 soldiers, stationed in 
the area of 15 most important checkpoints along the Dniester River.12 
The already mentioned 1992 peace agreement set out their 
responsibilities. Moreover, Russia's military support for Transnistria 
manifests itself in the stationing in Tiraspol of the so-called Russian 
Military Operational Group in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic 
of Moldova (Rus. Operativnaya gruppa rossiyskikh voysk v 
Pridnestrovskom regione Respubliki Moldova), which was created as a 
result of the transformation of the Russian forces of the 14th Army in 
1995. The estimated size of these military personnel is about 1200 
soldiers.13 The aim of cooperation of this formation in the territory of 
the parastatal state is to secure post-Soviet weapon storage sites 
(mainly a large warehouse of weapons and ammunition in the village of 
Kolbasna) and to respond to the symptoms of instability in the region. 
Notably, the Operational Group is not a mechanism established based 
on the peace agreement ending the Moldovan-Transnistrian war, as 
Moldovan decision-makers have repeatedly stressed. In the eyes of 
Moldovan decision-makers, the presence of this formation undermines 
Moldova's constitutional provisions, its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and the fundamental norms of international law.14  
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The Tiraspol administration, on the other hand, is signaling the high 
level of effectiveness of the current form of the peacekeeping mission, 
as evidenced by the lack of armed clashes in a separate security area 
since the establishment of the forces. Moreover, it is a disincentive for 
the Republic of Moldova to try again to pacify the separatist sentiments 
in Transnistria militarily. When assessing the Russian military 
potential operating in the parastatal area (mainly battalions of 
motorized riflemen), it is worth noting that it is large enough to 
adequately secure the most important points of the region, such as the 
capital and the right-bank Bender. This is possible with coordinated 
cooperation with the potential of Transnistria (the parastatal armed 
forces are about 7,500 soldiers). In the strategic dimension, the 
neighborhood of Transnistria with Ukraine is important. Concentration 
of potential on the Moldovan (Transnistrian)-Ukrainian border could 
contribute to destabilization of the southern part of Ukraine, in other 
words the Odessa region (although these forces would not be able to 
resist joint actions of Moldovan-Ukrainian forces effectively). 
Consequently, the Russian armed forces in the Transnistrian region are 
not only a direct threat to Moldova's security, but also a challenge to 
regional security. 
 
As far as the economic and social sphere of support for the PMR 
(Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) provided by Russia is concerned, 
it is worth mentioning a few aspects of it. The way the region's economy 
functions is important for the proper interpretation of bilateral 
cooperation between these entities. Due to the small internal market, 
Tiraspol focuses primarily on exports of its goods to foreign markets. 
Moscow is a key trading partner for Tiraspol. According to 2018 data 
from the State Customs Committee of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian 
Republic, relations with Russia account for 29 percent of total trade in 
Transnistria. In addition, Transnistrian exports to the Russian market 
have increased by 34 percent compared to 2017. Transnistria exports to 
the Russian Federation mainly chemical products, vegetables (fresh 
and frozen), clothing, and engineering products.15 In addition to 
intensive trade between entities, it is worth stressing the importance of 
the Russian labor market, which generates significant revenues for the 
Transnistrian budget. The majority of paraphernalia's inhabitants who 
decide to work abroad are now going to Russia. An example illustrating 
the importance of this important issue is data from the Transnistrian 
Republican Bank. The only in the period from January to March 2019; 
the volume of private money transfers transferred via electronic 
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systems amounted to over $22 million. As much as 62.9 percent (in 
other words about $5 million) of this amount were money transfers 
from persons residing in Russia.16 
 
Targeted subsidies and gas subsidies are an extremely important 
manifestation of the Russian Federation's financial support for 
strengthening the state of Transnistria.17 Russian direct subsidies 
strengthen a number of aspects of the parastatal state's social security. 
For social security, since 2008 the Russian Federation pays out 
allowances for the pensions of quasi-state residents. In addition, it also 
supports health care (financing the modernization of hospital wards, 
purchase of modern equipment) and education (financing the 
construction, and renovation of schools and kindergartens, printing 
textbooks).18 In this context, the organization of the Eurasian Initiative 
in Moscow (Rus. Avtonomnaya Nekommercheskaya Organizatsiya 
'yevraziyskaya integratsiya'), which provides a platform for material aid 
to Transnistria, is important. The organization started its activity in 
2012 and thanks to Russian funds; it was possible to implement many 
social projects in the parastatal area, including the construction of 
schools and kindergartens (e.g. the construction of kindergarten no. 6 
in the Rybnica area).19 It is worth remembering that the above-
mentioned organization and the "Eurasian Transnistria" project are 
part of the Russian Federation's propaganda tools for strengthening the 
image of Transnistria as part of the "Russian World,” in other words 
the Russian cultural and civilization space.20 
 
The discussed tools used by Moscow are a priority for the functioning 
of the unrecognized state and the position of its inhabitants on the 
potential reintegration of Transnistria into the Republic of Moldova. 
Financial support not only determines the survival of Transnistria in its 
current form, but also strongly reinforces the public's reluctance to 
consider reintegrating into Moldova in the future, as social standards 
are significantly higher in Transnistria than in Moldova. Moldova, as 
the poorest European country, does not appear to be an attractive 
entity for the population of the parastatal state and therefore sees no 
need for reintegration. Notably, if Tiraspol were to be completely 
deprived of support from the Russian Federation, the parastatal state 
will not be able to continue to exist without serious problems in the 
economic sphere.  
 
Since relations between Russia and Transnistria are asymmetrical (in 
Russia's favor); Transnistria is not a fully independent entity in terms 
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of creating political lines. With its economic instruments, Moscow is 
largely creating Transnistrian political elites, as the support of Russian 
decision-makers building the prosperity of the PMR is an important 
factor for the electorate during the elections in the parastatal territory. 
Therefore, the political forces of Transnistria are competing for support 
from the Russian ally. It is worth remembering that the characteristic 
feature of the PMR's party system is the strong pro-Russianism of all 
parties (ideological homogeneity).  
 
An example perfectly illustrating the influence of the Russian 
Federation on the power structure of the parastatal state is the recent 
presidential elections in 2016. The winner was Vadim Krasnosielski, 
who in the past worked for the Sheriff holding company, the largest 
company in Transnistria, which is part of the empire of post-Soviet 
billionaires Victor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly, who have companies in 
Russia and Ukraine.21 Not without significance was Krasnoselsky’s 
strong pro-Russian attitude, which in the perception of Transnistrian 
society was to guarantee further cooperation with Moscow, extremely 
important for the functioning of the parastatal state in its current 
format, or the rapid implementation of the postulate to join 
Transnistria to the Russian Federation. 
 
Finally, the Russian Federation is involved in the negotiations on the 
final settlement of the status of Transnistria. Moscow has repeatedly 
supported the interests of Tiraspol during the talks. It is worth 
mentioning that it was the Russian side that was the architect of the so-
called the Kozak Memorandum (2003), which advocated the 
federalization of Moldova as a solution to the Chisinau-Tiraspol 
conflict, in other words strengthening the position of the region in the 
structure of the Moldovan state, which would de facto mean 
legitimizing its independence.22 
 
Ideological foundations of Russian Foreign Policy 
 
To interpret the short- and long-term strategic benefits of supporting 
non-recognized states properly (in this case Transnistria) for Russia, 
one should first consider the ideological foundations of Russian foreign 
policy and its perception and position in international relations. 
Undoubtedly, the political line created by Russian decision-makers fits 
into a realistic concept of international relations, emphasizing the 
priority of the national interest and the need to defend its values 
against threats from the international environment, emphasizing the 
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need to use hard power resources. It is worth recalling the words of 
Hans Joachim Morgenthau, who pointed out that the main axis of 
clashes between states is the struggle for political power understood as 
the psychological relationship between those who hold power and those 
who are subject to it.23 Only the maximization of power gives an 
adequate level of security. Russian decision-makers display strong 
geopolitical thinking. In addition, two currents of thought that have 
had a huge impact on the process of forming a perception of Russia's 
place in the global game for power: Isolationism and Eurasianism. The 
representative of the first trend was Vadim Tsymburskiy, who in his 
article entitled “The Island of Russia. The perspectives of Russian 
geopolitics” (Rus. Ostrov Rossiya. Perspektivy rossiyskoy geopolitiki) 
emphasized that in the space between the Atlantic and the Pacific there 
are two civilizations next to each other: Russian and Western. Russia's 
large territory and Russian hegemony over large areas in the past are 
extremely important. The population living in the Russian Federation 
has a different perception of the world than the representatives of the 
western civilization.24 According to Tsymburskiy, the main concern of 
the Russian center of power should be to prevent other entities from 
interfering in the internal affairs of the state, while in terms of external 
policy; the Russian influence should spread to the western and 
southern border areas. 
 
In the case of Eurasianism, the most famous representative of this 
ideological trend today is Alexander Dugin. He postulates a rebirth of 
Russia as Eurasia, a messianic empire that will balance the global 
influences of Atlanticism. It is worth noting Dugin's 2009 publication 
The Fourth Political Theory, which is still under discussion. The 
geopolitician stressed the need to create a new ideology that would be 
an adequate response to the security challenges of the 21st century. It is 
to be an alternative to the hegemonic position of liberalism, in which he 
sees the greatest threat to the Russian Federation and the whole world. 
The starting point for his deliberations is the thesis that the three most 
important political theories of the 20th century were communism, 
fascism, and liberalism. Although the latter defeated fascism and 
communism, Dugin sees the crisis of the “second wave of 
democratization” and social discontent in various states, and therefore 
proposes to mobilize international efforts to create a fourth theory, a 
bridge between East and West.25 
 
All the above trends influence the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation and the perception of its position in international relations. 
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A characteristic feature of the created political line is the influence of 
conservatism, which postulates the need for restitution of tradition, 
Russian culture, and Orthodox values, as well as manifestation of 
distinctness in relation to the West. Emphasizing Russian traditional 
values such as hierarchy, a strong center of power (reference to the 
tsarist self-leasing), a strong national identity and perception of Russia 
as a great power is an extremely important component building the 
identity of Russians. Due to its historical history, the Russian 
Federation perceives its importance on the international arena in the 
multi-layer categories, and thus the post-Soviet space states appear to 
be a traditional sphere of influence. An effective tool for the 
implementation of the postulate strengthens the identity of Russians 
and the reintegration of the post-Soviet area as a supra-state 
community is the already mentioned concept of the Russian World.26 
The Russian administration has often stressed the defensive nature of 
the political line, explaining all the aggressive actions that are 
necessary to respond to the hostile actions of the West. Russia appears 
in this view as a "besieged fortress,” in other words an entity that alone 
resists the destructive forces of the Atlantic states, striving to weaken 
its international position. For example, Moscow indicated that Western 
support for colorful revolutions threatens Russian civilization and 
minimize its impact in the traditional sphere of influence.27 This is an 
unacceptable situation for a state whose foreign policy priority is to 
restore its position as a power capable of transforming the world order. 
 
Strategic Benefits for the Russian Federation Arising from 
Support for Transnistria 
 
The place of parastatal states in Russia's strategy should be considered 
through the prism of such a political line. As Sergey Markedonov 
rightly points out, the geopolitical rivalry-taking place between the 
West (interpreted as a merger of the powers of the USA, the European 
Union, and NATO) and the Russian Federation determines the political 
and social situations of the parastatal states.28 By cooperating with the 
unrecognized Transnistrian Republic of Moldova, Russia receives a 
number of benefits for its positioning in international relations. The 
existence of an entity within the Republic of Moldova, which reveals 
separatist tendencies and is strongly linked to Russia, means that 
Moldovan politicians must take into account Moscow's stance on the 
country's activity in the international arena. The Kremlin's priority is to 
keep Moldova in the orbit of Russian influence and to keep it in its 
sphere of influence. Transnistria is a useful instrument for exerting 
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pressure on Chisinau. Russia is sending a clear message – if Moldova 
intensifies its efforts to participate in Euro-Atlantic structures (the 
European Union and NATO), it will support (also militarily) 
Transnistria's efforts to break away from Moldova, which will 
destabilize the country's internal situation. Such a scenario carries the 
risk of, for example, unfreezing the Moldovan-Transnistrian armed 
conflict, which would pose a threat to security in the region. 
 
The best example of preventing Moldova from becoming independent 
of Russian influence is Moscow's reaction to the signing of an 
association agreement between this country and the European Union 
(27 June 2014). Shortly before this document was initialed by Moldova 
(November 2013), the Rospotrebnadzor questioned the quality of 
Moldovan wines by prohibiting its import to the Russian Federation, 
which resulted in a 30 percent reduction in Moldovan wine exports in 
2014. However, the sanctions described above did not apply to the 
para-state and the pro-Russian region of Gagauzia, famous for its wine 
production.29 On the other hand, after the signing of the association 
agreement, Russian sanctions also included a restriction on fresh fruit 
imports, as experts pointed out, due to a violation of laboratory control 
of products, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned 
that the signing of an agreement with the EU forces Russia to re-
examine trade relations with Moldova.30 In addition, the Russian 
administration has begun to influence Moldova's human capital 
without extending the contracts to Moldovan workers. 
 
In addition to these politically motivated sanctions, Moscow has begun 
to create an opportunity to support the separatist tendencies of 
Transnistria actively in the event that Moldova continues to maintain a 
pro-Western political line and deepen its relations with EU and NATO 
member states. Already in October 2014, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov stressed that if Moldova withdraws from the status of a 
non-blocking state and participates in a political-military alliance, the 
people of Transnistria will be fully entitled to decide on their future. In 
the perception of the authorities in Tiraspol, the noticeable 
strengthening of Chisinau's cooperation with NATO is a tool to put 
pressure on Transnistria to abandon its independence and efforts to 
integrate with Russia.31 Undoubtedly, by strengthening the 
independence tendencies of paraphernalia, Russia is weakening 
Moldova's potential for full integration with the EU, but also with 
NATO. Moldova's neutrality status is enshrined in Article 11 of its 
Constitution, but in the second decade of the 21st century, there is a 
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clear strengthening of Chisinau's cooperation with NATO, which is 
enshrined in the National Defense Strategy for 2018-2022, adopted by 
the Moldovan authorities in 2018. The document envisages a 
professionalization of Moldova's potential and an increase in funding 
for the defense and security sector, as shown by the doubling of the 
defense budget from 625 million MDL (2018) to 1.5 billion MDL 
(2025). It is worth noting that the systematic increase in spending on 
the development of the armed forces will pose a challenge to the 
Moldovan budget.  
 
There is no doubt that Chisinau will count on dynamic cooperation in 
this area with Western structures such as NATO, which may be 
interpreted by Moscow and Tiraspol as an aspiration to phase out the 
status of a non-block state. This is justified because the content of the 
strategy is not just a collection of provisions concerning the short and 
long-term perspective of Moldova's security. The document has an 
annex containing an action plan for the implementation of the new 
defense strategy, with detailed guidelines for the planned steps, with a 
specification of the institutions responsible, a time horizon and 
estimated costs (budgetary and external financing). The annex provides 
for, among other things, increasing the participation of Chisinau's 
forces in international operations under the auspices of the UN to the 
battalion within 6 months of the adoption of the strategy with the 
support of technical and financial assistance projects from outside, or 
further strengthening of partnership relations with NATO, including 
the strengthening of defense capabilities.32  
 
Further tightening of cooperation between NATO and Chisinau in the 
future may result in Moscow using Tiraspol as a tool to prevent the 
aforementioned cooperation and, at the same time, to keep Moldova in 
the Russian sphere of influence. Russia will treat the approximation of 
Alliance structures as a threat to national security and its privileged 
position in the post-Soviet area.. The Russian Federation uses its 
influence over the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, 
which in this context is an instrument of reactive policy of the Russian 
Federation, in other words taking steps to counteract the weakening of 
the hegemony's position in the post-Soviet space. Russia may inspire 
the Transnistrian administration to reveal anti-Moldovan sentiments 
among the people of the region, which will ultimately deepen the 
country's internal destabilization. The lack of full control of the center 
of power in Chisinau over the entire territory of the country is an 
effective barrier to integration with Western political structures. Thus, 
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the first important function of the Moscow-Tiraspol strategic 
partnership is to prevent the Republic of Moldova from being included 
in the Western sphere of influence (full participation in the European 
Union and potential participation in NATO). 
 
The Russian Federation tries to take all steps to protect its possessions 
(integration of the post-Soviet area and hegemony status), which 
strengthens its capacity to match the political resources of adversaries 
from the western civilization. Transnistria not only strengthens 
Russia's position in competition for membership in the Western or 
Russian sphere of influence, but also weakens its independence and 
freedom in creating its foreign policy lines. As the intensity of the 
conflict increases in eastern Ukraine (2014- ), some researchers 
pointed to the possibility of using the territory of Transnistria as a 
starting point for convenient military operations in the Odessa region 
due to its geographical location and the common Transnistrian-
Ukrainian section of the border. Although these assumptions have not 
worked, it is impossible not to agree that Transnistria is an important 
component of the ongoing conflict. Many Transnistrian volunteers with 
experience on the battlefield due to their participation in the 
Moldovan-Transnistrian war are strengthening the separatist ranks of 
Donetsk and Lugansk. As the prosecutor of Chisinau, Igor Popa, 
stressed, the recruitment of Moldovan militants is increasing and 
constitutes a clear threat to the state.33 In addition, Ukrainian 
separatists are buying weapons and ammunition from the 
aforementioned warehouse in Kolbasna. The stationing of Russian 
armed forces in Transnistria is an instrument of psychological pressure 
on Kiev. The alliance ties with the separatist Transnistria strengthen 
pressure on Ukraine and constitute a potential source of danger for that 
country. 
 
Thanks to the benefits described above for the Russian Federation 
resulting from supporting the statehood of Transnistria, it is 
strengthening its position in the global competition for power with 
adversaries, in other words the Euro-Atlantic states. The current lack of 
prospects for reintegration of Moldova's territory distracts the country 
from the goal of full participation in EU structures, and thus keeps it in 
the Russian sphere of influence. Despite clear efforts of member states 
to implement appropriate structural reforms in Moldova, which would 
allow it to meet the Copenhagen Criteria or the active action of EU 
representatives during the 5 plus 2 negotiations, Russia wins the 
competition for Moldova's membership in a given sphere of influence 
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(Russian or Western). Moscow using, among other things, the issue of 
the unregulated status of Transnistria and the low effectiveness of 
Moldova's political line towards paraphernalia due to the weakness of 
Moldova's political elites and the lack of a coherent approach to this 
problem.34 Cooperation with the parastatal states enables Russia to 
lower the projections of Western powers in the post-Soviet area, 
making them an effective tool for strengthening the implementation of 
Russia's multi-layered aspirations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Undoubtedly, the cooperation of the Russian Federation with the 
parastatal state of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic implies 
many advantages for Russia's position in international relations and at 
the same time poses a challenge for regional security in the future. 
Moscow supports the strengthening of the statehood of this entity on 
many levels, including substantial financial support and the presence of 
Russian armed forces on its territory. The assistance provided affects 
the mood of the inhabitants of Transnistria, who are reluctant to 
reintegrate the parastatal state into Moldova, thus fulfilling the goal of 
Russia's political line of keeping Moldova in the Russian sphere of 
influence. Due to the aspirations of Russian political decision-makers, 
which have their roots in the history, political traditions, and culture of 
the country, the priority assumption of the Russian Federation is to 
maintain the position of a hegemon in the post-Soviet area, which is a 
traditional area of Russian influence. Therefore, every effort goes to 
limit the involvement of the West in this region, which is as a threat to 
the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. Developing friendly 
relations with paraphernalia is one of the instruments for reducing the 
importance of Western civilization and weakening the aspirations of 
post-Soviet states to participate in the EU and NATO. These treatments 
are part of the geopolitical competition for power between Russia and 
the West. In view of the benefits for the projection of Russia's power in 
the region, it should be stated that close cooperation with parastatals, 
including Transnistria, has a positive impact on the positioning of the 
country in international relations and enables the implementation of 
assumptions regarding the defense of the state of possession (the 
position of hegemony in the post-Soviet area). Therefore, we can 
confirm the research hypothesis. Initiated work on the article 
prompted the author to conduct further research on the place of states 
not recognized in Russian politics, including the accumulation of its 
power. Undoubtedly, it is worth following events in parastatal states, 
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such as Transnistria, for example, because of their significance for 
regional and global security. 
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